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Abstract 
TNO has evaluated a baseline audio and a video fingerprinting system based on robust hashing 
for the TRECVID 2008 copy detection task. We participated in the audio, the video and the 
combined audio-video copy detection task. The audio fingerprinting implementation clearly 
outperformed the video fingerprinting implementation. We combined the audio fingerprinting 
results with the video fingerprint result, both from the TNO run, and from the submitted video 
run with the strongest correlation in the results. 
 
1. Philips robust hash copy detection 
The Philips Robust Hash (PRH) generates fingerprints consisting of a binary time-series [1], [2]. 
The PRH for audio and video use different features, but result in fingerprints with a comparable 
structure. Therefore the matching and database procedures are identical, although parameters may 
vary. The features are computed for each audio or video frame, and such a per-frame fingerprint 
is called a sub-fingerprint. A sequence of sub-fingerprints used for identification is called a 
fingerprint block. The hamming distance or Bit Error Rate (BER) is used to compute the distance 
between two fingerprint blocks. 
 
In the enrollment (ingest) phase, a look-up table of sub-fingerprints is created for each clip. In the 
identification phase, (a selection of) the sub-fingerprints from the fingerprint block of the query 
fingerprint are matched against the database of pre-computed fingerprints. For more details, 
please refer to [1] and [2]. 
 
2. Video copy detection 
For the video copy detection task we generated sub-fingerprints using the Haar based fingerprint 
described in [2]. This sub-fingerprint uses differences of average intensities in blocks in the 
images, and hence is robust to a number of video transformations (noise, affine intensity 
changes). A difference between subsequent frames is taken to into video motion into the 
fingerprint. From the sub-fingerprints a 16-bit index is generated for each of the video files. 
 
A single sub-fingerprint does not have enough distinctive power to perform a search. Therefore 
for a given query video the index is used to find initial matches between the query and the 
database video. These initial matches contain some false matches and (hopefully) all the correct 
matches. 
 
For each initial match we determine the matching score for an interval of fixed length between 
the query and database video using the sum of absolute differences between the sub-fingerprints. 
If the difference is below a threshold the interval is expanded. In this way the length of the match 
can grow untill the query and database video do not match any more. A final score of the 
matched interval is calculated using the BER and length of the interval. Finally the matched 
intervals are thresholded and combined into the final matches. 
 
After receiving the TRECVID copy detection results, we discovered an error in the script 
generating the text document submitted to NIST. The error printed an incorrect query ID. 
Therefore, almost none of the results matched the ground truth tables used in the evaluation. 
Table 1 and Table 2 contain the results that have been corrected for this specific error. The tables 
have been generated by the evaluation software provided by NIST after the closing date of the 
copy detection task. The difference between TNO.v.1 and TNO.v.2. is the value of the threshold 
used to determine whether two intervals match or not. 
 
From literature and analysis we know that the algorithm has difficulties when the reference 
material is geometrically or temporally distorted. This potentially includes transformation types 1 
(camcording), 2 (PIP) and the mixture transform types 6 and 7 (including frame drops, ratio 
change), 8 and 9 (including crop, shift, flip) and 10 (5 randomly selected distortion). In the tables 
we can indeed see worst performance for transform types 1-2, and the composite distortions 7-10. 
 
Literature suggests to use 32 bits/frame; in our implementation we used 16 bits/frame. Further 
analysis should show whether this implementation choice limited the discrimination capabilities 
of the fingerprints. 
 
3. Audio copy detection 
 
We used a baseline implementation of the audio PRH as described in [1]. Contrary to video, the 
audio has to be framed for processing by the algorithm. Every 11.6 msec a 32 bit sub-fingerprint 
is extracted based on two subsequent audio frames. The audio frames have strong overlap 
(approx 96%). The 32 bit sub-fingerprint is based on 33 log-spaced frequency bands in the range 
300-2000 Hz. Each frequency band matches the base frequency of a tone. Each individual 
fingerprint block of 256 sub-fingerprints should be below a detection threshold. The confidence 
is computed over the entire detected fingerprint block.  
 
In the TRECVID scenario, two factors contribute to the confidence: BER and interval length. We 
have chosen to relate the combined confidence score to the probability that the detection is 
actually a false positive. Therefore, we model the BER of two non-related fragments as a random 
number drawn from a normal distribution with average value 1/2 and the variance which is linear 
with the length of the fragments that are compared. We relate the confidence score to the 
probability density level of the before mentioned BER distribution. 
 
 
Table 1  Detailed results for run TNO.v.1, bug-fixed after official submission 
 
TNO.v.1.fixed Transformations 
 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 104 5
Total_Queries   441 284 296 313 330 244 141 333 352 269
Mean_F1  0.619 0.000 0.720 0.594 0.731 0.603 0.391 0.818 0.000 0.119
Mean_proc_time 22948.89 20701.51 22460.93 23267.31 24130.68 21809.90 20983.85 23207.36 23758.94 23059.55
Total_proc_time 4612727  4161003 4514646 4676729 4850267 4383790 4217753 4664680 4775547 4634970
TP_count 2 0 17 20 28 33 21 4 0 1
Miss_count   132 134 117 114 106 101 113 130 134 133
FA_count   439 284 279 293 302 211 120 329 352 268
Min_NDCR  1.245 1.267 1.161 1.081 1.228 1.056 0.997 1.053 1.563 1.375
 
 
 
Table 2   Detailed results for run TNO.v.2, bug-fixed after official submission 
 
TNO.v.2.fixed Transformations 
 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 104 5
Total_Queries   217 94 164 108 223 60 16 136 146 66
Mean_F1  0.065 0.000 0.651 0.372 0.714 0.339 0.324 0.327 0.000 0.000
Mean_proc_time   6465.35 6131.74 7367.05 6515.33 8060.23 7067.80 5994.73 5945.62 6024.74 7045.96
Total_proc_time 1299536  1232480 1480777 1309582 1620107 1420627 1204941 1195069 1210972 1416237
TP_count 1 0 39 15 85 13 3 4 0 0
Miss_count   133 134 95 119 49 121 131 130 134 134
FA_count   216 94 125 93 138 47 13 132 146 66
Min_NDCR  1.315 1.064 0.897 0.993 0.644 0.993 1.000 1.120 1.131 1.071
By taking the log, and discarding some of the constant terms, we get the following confidence 
score: 
 
 Conf = log10(-(BER - 1/2)/ sqrt((const/len))) 
 
Where 0 <= BER <= 1 and len is the fingerprint block length in audio frames, and the constant is 
the scaling factor between the variance and the length. 
 
Table 3 shows the audio fingerprinting results. 
 
Table 3  Detailed results for run TNO.a.1 
 
 Transformations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Total_Queries 133 133 133 133 129 129 127
Mean_F1 0.957 0.961 0.963 0.962 0.688 0.681 0.605
Mean_proc_time 213.83 211.88 200.78 200.93 249.60 232.86 236.58
Total_proc_time 42980 42587 40356 40387 50169 46804 47553
TP_count 131 131 131 131 127 127 125
Miss_count 3 3 3 3 7 7 9
FA_count 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Min_NDCR 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.049 0.049 0.064
 
 
Analysis shows that: 
- Actually one query did not result in a detected copy for all transformation types;  
- Two queries resulted in the same wrong identification result for all transformations; 
- Four queries were made undetectable by transformations 5-7;  
- Transformation 7 rendered two additional queries undetectable. 
 
Transformations 1-4 mainly encompass compression (mp2, mp3), companding, bandpass 
filtering. Transformations 5-7 all include mixture with speech, with unknown mixing weights. 
 
4. Combined audio-video detection 
Audio and video fingerprinting systems can be combined at different levels, e.g. at the feature 
level, the fingerprint level or at the decision level. Due to the nature of our results and the 
combination with a run which was not our own submission, we chose a combination at decision 
level. For the first two combination methods, the audio and video fingerprinting systems should 
also be temporally aligned. 
 
Analysis of the submitted audio and video runs showed little correlation between the runs. 
Therefore, we submitted both a combination of our video and audio run, as well as a combination 
of our audio run, and the video run which showed most overlap with our audio run. 
 
 
 
 
Since the combination is based on the individual audio and video copy detector outputs, two 
choices determine the effect of the combination:  
a. the operator used to combine the results 
b. how to deal with conflicting audio and video results  (can be a result of step a) 
c. how to compute the joint confidence score 
 
The individual confidence scores are normalized as follows. A joint-Gaussian PDF for the 
confidence scores is assumed. Since we did not measure a strong correlation between the audio 
and video confidence scores, we chose to normalize individually such that each confidence score 
have average equal to 0 and variance equal to 1. The joint confidence is computed as the 
summation of the individual normalized scores. We then added some positive constant to make 
sure that the resulting confidence score is positive. A remark should be made about the fact that 
the only the confidence scores are known that have resulted in a hypothesized positive detection. 
 
The confidence of the individual copy detection result corresponds to the entire detection copy 
interval. However, in the combination only a part of this may be considered. Without any 
knowledge of the underlying confidence measure, it becomes difficult to estimate the partial 
confidence for part of the interval. Furthermore, the relation between interval length and 
confidence score may be non-linear, as in the confidence score used in the audio copy detection 
run. 
 
TNO has submitted the following combination runs: 
TNO.m.A01 intersection of  TNO.a.01 and TNO.v.01 
TNO.m.A02 ‘or’ of  TNO.a.01 and TNO.v.01, with removal of overlap 
TNO.m.B01  intersection of  TNO.a.01 and INRIA-LEAR.v.Soft. 
 
Since the submitted TNO.v.1. run contains almost no correct results due to a processing error, we 
concentrate the result analysis on the TNO.m.B01 run. This run is based on the INRIA-
LEAR.v.Soft video run and the TNO.a.01 audio run. 
 
In the experiments, we used an intersection operation. That is, the audio and video results should 
point to the same reference video, and only the overlap is considered to be correct. In this way, 
the confidence is raised, and the false positive detection rate is lowered or kept constant. The 
number of false misses, however, potentially increases. For instance, if either the audio or video 
is correct, but not both, the result is still discarded, irrespective of the associated confidence 
scores. 
 
This is illustrated by comparing the audio run with the audio-video run, averaged over the video 
transformations. Both are shown in Table 4 and Table 5.
Table 4   Selection of results for run TNO.a.1 
TNO.a.1 Transformation 
 1 2 4 5 6 73
Total_Queries 133 133 133 133 129 129 127
TP_count 131 131 131 131 127 127 125
Miss_count   3 3 3 3 7 7 9
FA_count   2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Min_NDCR  0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.049 0.049 0.064
 
Table 5   Selection of results for run TNO.m.B01,  averaged over the video transformation types 
TNO.m.B01 Transformation 
--> audio view 1 2 4 5 6 73
Total_Queries 127.4 128.1 128.6 128.1 125.4 129.7 120.1
TP_count  126.4 127.1 127.6 127.1 123.7 128.7 119.1
Miss_count 7.6 6.9 6.4 6.9 10.3 5.3 14.9
FA_count   1 1 1 1 1.7 1 1
Min_NDCR  0.0498 0.0443 0.0405 0.0443 0.0651 0.0323 0.1042
 
Table 6   Selection of results for run INRIA.LEAR.v.Soft.results,  averaged over the video transformation types 
INRIA-
LEAR.v.Soft.results Transformation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Total_Queries   794 338 336 197 266 326 406 613 668 665
TP_count 131  130 134 132 134 130 129 134 132 122
Miss_count  4 0 2 0 4 5 0 2 123
FA_count   663 208 202 65 132 196 277 479 536 543
Min_NDCR  0.126 0.046 0.015 0.038 0.012 0.069 0.115 0.045 0.080 0.246
 
Table 7   Selection of results for run TNO.m.B01,  averaged over the video transformation types 
TNO.m.B01 Transformation 
--> video view 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 104 5
Total_Queries  128.1 127.9 127.9 126.3 127 126.4 126.1 125.6 125.7 126.7
TP_count  127.1 126.9 126.7 125.1 125.9 125.3 125 124.4 124.6 125.7
Miss_count   6.9 7.1 7.3 8.9 8.1 8.7 9 9.6 9.4 8.3
FA_count   1 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1
Min_NDCR  0.0440 0.0461 0.0463 0.0581 0.0527 0.0570 0.0590 0.0633 0.0623 0.0547
The same holds for the comparison of the INRIA video run with the audio-video run, averaged 
over the audio transformations shown in Table 7. The video run table was generated using the 
NIST evaluation software on the INRIA run submission. 
 
We hypothesize that the intersection operation for combining audio and video results at decision 
level is probably a too crude and conservative operation, further investigation is needed for 
finding more effective combination methods.  
 
5. Discussion 
Fingerprint size/rate is an essential parameter which should be taken into account when 
comparing fingerprinting systems. Within the capabilities of a certain approach (e.g. robustness 
to certain distortions, etc.), the fingerprint size usually determines the performance vs. search 
time trade-off. A larger fingerprint can lower the false positive (and false negative) probability of 
a detection, but increases the search space since more unique fingerprints can be represented by a 
larger fingerprint. 
 
Although audio fingerprinting seems to be more mature and the complexity of distortions might 
be lower, it is hard to say that ‘audio fingerprinting is easier than video fingerprinting’. In the 
TRECVID copy detection task, the distortions that were considered for audio were not that 
severe. For instance, there were no distortions that effectively scale time of frequency. For video, 
the equivalent would be distortions that change the geometrical of temporal structure of the 
video. Examples of these kinds of distortions are horizontal flip, picture-in-picture, camcording 
and frame drops. Some of these distortions actually preserve the geometrical structure of the 
reference material, but the overall geometrical structure of the query is different. 
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